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## SEMANTICAL INVESTIGATIONS ON SOME WEAK MODAL LOGICS. Part I\*

### Abstract

In this paper we examine weak logics similar to  $\mathbf{S0.5}[\Box\Phi]$ , where  $\Phi \subseteq \mathbf{S0.5}$ . We also examine their versions (one of which is  $\mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}[\Box\Phi]$ ) that are closed under replacement of tautological equivalents (rte). We have that:  $\mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}[\Box(\mathcal{K}), \Box(\mathcal{T})] \subsetneq \mathbf{S0.9}$ ,  $\mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}[\Box(\mathcal{X}), \Box(\mathcal{T})] \subsetneq \mathbf{S1}$ , and in general, if  $\Phi \subseteq \mathbf{E1}$ , then  $\mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}[\Box\Phi] \subsetneq \mathbf{S2}$ .

In the second part we shall give simplified semantics for these logics, formulated by means of some Kripke-style models. We shall also prove that the logics in question are determined by some classes of these models.

*Key words:* Very weak modal logics, simplified Kripke-style semantics.

## 1. Preliminaries

### 1.1. Basic notions

Modal formulae are formed in the standard way from the set  $\text{At}$  of propositional letters: ‘ $p$ ’, ‘ $q$ ’, ‘ $r$ ’, ‘ $p_0$ ’, ‘ $p_1$ ’, ‘ $p_2$ ’, ...; truth-value operators: ‘ $\neg$ ’, ‘ $\vee$ ’, ‘ $\wedge$ ’, ‘ $\supset$ ’, and ‘ $\equiv$ ’ (connectives of negation, disjunction, conjunction, material implication, and material equivalence, respectively); the modal operator ‘ $\Box$ ’ (necessity; the possibility sign ‘ $\Diamond$ ’ is the abbreviation of ‘ $\neg\Box\neg$ ’); and brackets. Let  $\text{For}$  be the set of all modal formulae.

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\*The first version of this work was presented during The Third Conference: *Non-Classical Logic. Theory and Applications*, NCU, Toruń, September 16–18, 2010.

In original Lewis' works (see e.g. [5]) the primitive modal operator is the possibility sign ' $\diamond$ '. The necessity sign ' $\square$ ' is the abbreviation of ' $\neg \diamond \neg$ '. Moreover, ' $\varphi \prec \psi$ ' (the strict implication) was used as an abbreviation of ' $\neg \diamond(\varphi \wedge \neg \psi)$ '.

In this paper, as in [4], the primitive modal operator is ' $\square$ ' and ' $\varphi \prec \psi$ ' is an abbreviation of ' $\square(\varphi \supset \psi)$ '. Moreover, similarly as in [5, 4], the strict equivalence ' $\varphi \asymp \psi$ ' is an abbreviation of ' $\square(\varphi \prec \psi) \wedge (\psi \prec \varphi)$ '.

For any formula  $\varphi$  let  $\text{sub}(\varphi)$  be the set of all instances of  $\varphi$ . For any set  $\Phi$  of formulae we put:  $\text{sub}(\Phi) := \bigcup_{\varphi \in \Phi} \text{sub}(\varphi)$ ,  $\square\Phi := \{\square\varphi : \varphi \in \Phi\}$  and  $\diamond\Phi := \{\diamond\varphi : \varphi \in \Phi\}$ .

Let **Taut** be the set of all classical tautologies (without the modal operator). We put  $\top := 'p \supset p'$ . Moreover, let **PL** be the set of modal formulae which are instances of classical tautologies. Of course,  $\mathbf{PL} = \text{sub}(\mathbf{Taut})$ .

A formula  $\varphi$  is *propositionally atomic* iff  $\varphi \in \text{At}$  or  $\varphi \in \square\text{For}$ . Let **PAt** be the set of all propositionally atomic formulae, i.e.  $\mathbf{PAt} := \text{At} \cup \square\text{For}$ .

Let  $\mathbf{Val}^{\text{cl}}$  be the set of all valuations  $V: \text{For} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  which preserve classical truth conditions for truth-value operators.

- LEMMA 1.1.    1.  $V \in \mathbf{Val}^{\text{cl}}$  iff for some assignment  $v: \mathbf{PAt} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ ,  $V$  is the unique extension of  $v$  by classical truth conditions for truth-value operators.
2. For any  $\varphi \in \text{For}$ :  $\varphi \in \mathbf{PL}$  iff for every assignment  $v: \mathbf{PAt} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  we have that  $V(\varphi) = 1$ , where  $V$  is the unique extension of  $v$  by classical truth conditions for truth-value operators.
3. For any  $\varphi \in \text{For}$ :  $\varphi \in \mathbf{PL}$  iff  $V(\varphi) = 1$ , for any  $V \in \mathbf{Val}^{\text{cl}}$ .

For any  $\Psi \subseteq \text{For}$  and  $\varphi \in \text{For}$  we write  $\Psi \models_{\mathbf{PL}} \varphi$  iff for any  $V$  from  $\mathbf{Val}^{\text{cl}}$ : if  $V(\Psi) \subseteq \{1\}$ , then  $V(\varphi) = 1$ . Of course,  $\Psi \models_{\mathbf{PL}} \varphi$  iff for some  $\{\psi_1, \dots, \psi_n\} \subseteq \Psi$ ,  $n \geq 0$ , we have that ' $\square(\psi_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \psi_n) \supset \varphi$ '  $\in \mathbf{PL}$ . We also write  $\Psi \models_{\mathbf{PL}} \Phi$  iff  $\Psi \models_{\mathbf{PL}} \varphi$ , for any  $\varphi \in \Phi$ .

A set  $\Sigma$  of modal formulae is a *modal system* iff  $\mathbf{PL} \subseteq \Sigma$  and  $\Sigma$  is closed under the rule of detachment for ' $\supset$ ' (*modus ponens*), i.e., for any  $\varphi, \psi \in \text{For}$ :

$$\text{if } \varphi \text{ and } \square\varphi \supset \psi \text{ are members of } \Sigma, \text{ so is } \psi. \quad (\text{MP})$$

A set of modal formulae is a *logic* iff it is a modal system and it is closed under the rule of uniform substitution. Of course, **PL** is the smallest modal system and it is a logic.

For any modal system  $\Sigma$ , any  $\Psi \subseteq \text{For}$  and any  $\varphi \in \text{For}$ :  $\varphi$  is *deducible from  $\Psi$  in  $\Sigma$*  (written:  $\Psi \vdash_{\Sigma} \varphi$ ) iff for some  $\{\psi_1, \dots, \psi_n\} \subseteq \Psi$ ,  $n \geq 0$ , we have that  $\ulcorner (\psi_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \psi_n) \supset \varphi \urcorner \in \Sigma$ . Of course,  $\models_{\mathbf{PL}} = \vdash_{\mathbf{PL}} \subseteq \vdash_{\Sigma}$ . Moreover,  $\Sigma \vdash_{\Sigma} \varphi$  iff  $\varphi \in \Sigma$  iff  $\emptyset \vdash_{\Sigma} \varphi$ .

A system  $\Sigma$  is *consistent* iff  $\Sigma \neq \text{For}$ ; equivalently in the light of propositional logic  $\mathbf{PL}$ , iff ' $p \wedge \neg p$ ' does not belong to  $\Sigma$ .

To simplify notation of logics we use the following code. If  $\Lambda$  is a logic and  $\Phi \subseteq \text{For}$ , then  $\Lambda[\Phi]$  denotes the smallest logic which includes the set  $\Lambda \cup \Phi$ . We write  $\Lambda[\varphi_1, \dots, \varphi_n]$  instead of  $\Lambda[\{\varphi_1, \dots, \varphi_n\}]$ , and  $\Lambda[\Phi_1, \dots, \Phi_n]$  instead of  $\Lambda[\Phi_1 \cup \dots \cup \Phi_n]$ .

We say that a modal system is *congruential* (or *classical*) iff it is closed under the following rule of congruence, i.e., for any  $\varphi, \psi \in \text{For}$ :

$$\text{if } \ulcorner \varphi \equiv \psi \urcorner \in \Sigma, \text{ then } \ulcorner \Box \varphi \equiv \Box \psi \urcorner \in \Sigma. \quad (\text{RE})$$

FACT 1.2. *A modal system  $\Sigma$  is congruential iff it is closed under replacement, i.e., for any  $\varphi, \psi, \chi \in \text{For}$ :*

$$\text{if } \ulcorner \varphi \equiv \psi \urcorner \in \Sigma \text{ and } \chi \in \Sigma, \text{ then } \chi[\varphi/\psi] \in \Sigma, \quad (\text{RRE})$$

or equivalently:

$$\text{if } \ulcorner \varphi \equiv \psi \urcorner \in \Sigma, \text{ then } \ulcorner \chi[\varphi/\psi] \equiv \chi \urcorner \in \Sigma, \quad (\text{RRE}')$$

where  $\chi[\varphi/\psi]$  is any formula that results from  $\chi$  by replacing zero, one or more occurrences of  $\varphi$ , in  $\chi$ , by  $\psi$ .

A modal system  $\Sigma$  is called *monotonic* iff  $\Sigma$  is closed under the following rule of monotonicity, i.e., i.e., for any  $\varphi, \psi \in \text{For}$ :

$$\text{if } \ulcorner \varphi \supset \psi \urcorner \in \Sigma \text{ then } \ulcorner \Box \varphi \supset \Box \psi \urcorner \in \Sigma. \quad (\text{RM})$$

FACT 1.3. *A modal system is monotonic iff it is congruential and contains all instances of the following formula:*

$$\Box(p \wedge q) \supset (\Box p \wedge \Box q) \quad (\text{M})$$

A modal system  $\Sigma$  is called *regular* iff  $\Sigma$  is closed under the following regularity rule, i.e., for any  $\varphi, \psi, \chi \in \text{For}$ :

$$\text{if } \ulcorner (\varphi \wedge \psi) \supset \chi \urcorner \in \Sigma, \text{ then } \ulcorner (\Box \varphi \wedge \Box \psi) \supset \Box \chi \urcorner \in \Sigma. \quad (\text{RR})$$

FACT 1.4. *For any modal system the following conditions are equivalent:*

(a) *the system is regular,*

(b) *it is monotonic and contains all instances of*

$$\Box(p \supset q) \supset (\Box p \supset \Box q) \quad (\text{K})$$

(c) *it is monotonic and contains all instances of*

$$(\Box p \wedge \Box q) \supset \Box(p \wedge q) \quad (\text{C})$$

(d) *it is monotonic and contains all instances of*

$$(\Box(p \supset q) \wedge \Box(q \supset r)) \supset \Box(p \supset r) \quad (\text{X})$$

(e) *it is congruential and contains all instances of*

$$\Box(p \wedge q) \equiv (\Box p \wedge \Box q) \quad (\text{R})$$

To simplify notation of logics we use the following code. If  $\mathbf{A}$  is a regular logic and  $\Phi \subseteq \text{For}$ , then  $\mathbf{A} \oplus \Phi$  denotes the smallest regular logic which includes the set  $\mathbf{A} \cup \Phi$ . We write  $\mathbf{A} \oplus \varphi_1 \dots \varphi_n$  instead of  $\mathbf{A} \oplus \{\varphi_1, \dots, \varphi_n\}$ .

$\mathbf{C2}$  is the smallest regular logic and  $\mathbf{E2}$  is the smallest regular logic which contains (T), i.e.  $\mathbf{E2} = \mathbf{C2} \oplus (\text{T})$ .

We say that a modal system  $\Sigma$  is *normal* iff it contains all instances of (K) and is closed under the following rule:

$$\text{if } \varphi \in \Sigma, \text{ then } \ulcorner \Box \varphi \urcorner \in \Sigma. \quad (\text{RN})$$

FACT 1.5. *For any modal system the following conditions are equivalent:*

(a) *it is normal,*

(b) *it is regular and contains  $\Box \top$ ,*

(c) *it is congruential, contains  $\Box \top$  and includes sub(K).*

By the above fact, if  $\mathbf{A}$  is a normal logic, then  $\mathbf{A} \oplus \Gamma$  is as well. Indeed,  $\mathbf{A}$  is regular and contains  $\Box \top$ . Hence  $\mathbf{A} \oplus \Gamma$  is also regular and contains  $\Box \top$ . So  $\mathbf{A} \oplus \Gamma$  is normal.

In this paper we investigate some weak modal logics. For these logics we are using the following lemmas.

LEMMA 1.6. *For any modal system  $\Sigma$  which includes the following set*

$$E_{\mathbf{PL}} := \{ \ulcorner \Box\varphi \equiv \Box\psi \urcorner : \ulcorner \varphi \equiv \psi \urcorner \in \mathbf{PL} \},$$

1.  $\Box\top \in \Sigma$  iff  $\Box\mathbf{PL} \subseteq \Sigma$ .
2. If  $\text{sub}(\mathbf{X}) \subseteq \Sigma$ , then  $\text{sub}(\mathbf{K}) \subseteq \Sigma$ .

PROOF: 1. For any  $\tau \in \mathbf{PL}$ ,  $\ulcorner \tau \equiv \top \urcorner \in \mathbf{PL}$  and  $\ulcorner \Box\tau \equiv \Box\top \urcorner \in \Sigma$ , since  $E_{\mathbf{PL}} \subseteq \Sigma$ . Hence, by  $\mathbf{PL}$ , also  $\Box\tau \in \Sigma$ , since  $\Box\top \in \Sigma$ .

2. For any  $\varphi, \psi \in \text{For}$ ,  $\ulcorner \varphi \equiv (\top \supset \varphi) \urcorner \in \mathbf{PL}$  and  $\ulcorner \psi \equiv (\top \supset \psi) \urcorner \in \mathbf{PL}$ . So if  $E_{\mathbf{PL}} \subseteq \Sigma$ , then  $\ulcorner \Box\varphi \equiv \Box(\top \supset \varphi) \urcorner$  and  $\ulcorner \Box\psi \equiv \Box(\top \supset \psi) \urcorner$  belong to  $\Sigma$ . Moreover, if  $(\mathbf{X}) \in \Sigma$ , then  $\ulcorner (\Box(\top \supset \varphi) \wedge \Box(\top \supset \psi)) \supset \Box(\top \supset \psi) \urcorner \in \Sigma$ . Hence  $\ulcorner \Box(\varphi \supset \psi) \supset (\Box\varphi \supset \Box\psi) \urcorner \in \Sigma$ , by  $\mathbf{PL}$ .  $\dashv$

LEMMA 1.7 ([6]). *For any modal system  $\Sigma$ :  $\Sigma$  includes the following set*

$$M_{\mathbf{PL}} := \{ \ulcorner \Box\varphi \supset \Box\psi \urcorner : \ulcorner \varphi \supset \psi \urcorner \in \mathbf{PL} \}$$

iff  $E_{\mathbf{PL}} \subseteq \Sigma$  and  $\text{sub}(\mathbf{M}) \subseteq \Sigma$ .

LEMMA 1.8. *For any modal system  $\Sigma$  which includes  $M_{\mathbf{PL}}$ :*

$$\Box\mathbf{PL} \subseteq \Sigma \text{ iff } \Box\top \in \Sigma \text{ iff } \Sigma \text{ has some formula of the form } \ulcorner \Box\varphi \urcorner.$$

LEMMA 1.9 ([6]). *For any modal system  $\Sigma$  the following conditions are equivalent:*

- (a)  $\Sigma$  includes the following set

$$R_{\mathbf{PL}} := \{ \ulcorner (\Box\varphi \wedge \Box\psi) \supset \Box\chi \urcorner : \ulcorner (\varphi \wedge \psi) \supset \chi \urcorner \in \mathbf{PL} \},$$

- (b)  $M_{\mathbf{PL}} \subseteq \Sigma$  and  $\text{sub}(\mathbf{K}) \subseteq \Sigma$ ,
- (c)  $M_{\mathbf{PL}} \subseteq \Sigma$  and  $\text{sub}(\mathbf{X}) \subseteq \Sigma$ ,
- (d)  $M_{\mathbf{PL}} \subseteq \Sigma$  and  $\text{sub}(\mathbf{C}) \subseteq \Sigma$ ,
- (e)  $E_{\mathbf{PL}} \subseteq \Sigma$  and  $\text{sub}(\mathbf{R}) \subseteq \Sigma$ .

LEMMA 1.10. *Fix any system  $\Sigma$ :*

1. If  $E_{\mathbf{PL}} \subseteq \Sigma$ , then  $\Sigma$  contains all instances of the following formula

$$\Diamond p \equiv \neg\Box\neg p \quad (\text{df } \Diamond)$$

2. If  $R_{\mathbf{PL}} \subseteq \Sigma$ , then  $\Sigma$  contains all instances of the following formulae

$$\diamond(p \vee q) \equiv (\diamond p \vee \diamond q) \quad (\mathbf{R}^\diamond)$$

$$\diamond(p \supset q) \equiv (\Box p \supset \diamond q) \quad (\mathbf{R}^{\diamond\Box})$$

LEMMA 1.11. For any modal system  $\Sigma$ :

1. If  $E_{\mathbf{PL}} \subseteq \Sigma$ , then  $\Sigma$  contains all instances of the following formula

$$(p \prec q) \equiv \neg \diamond(p \wedge \neg q) \quad (\mathbf{df}' \prec)$$

2. If  $R_{\mathbf{PL}} \subseteq \Sigma$ , then  $\Sigma$  contains all instances of

$$(p \prec q) \equiv \Box(p \equiv q) \quad (\mathbf{df}' \prec)$$

LEMMA 1.12. For any modal system  $\Sigma$ :

1. If  $\Sigma$  contains all instances of the following formula

$$\Box p \supset p \quad (\mathbf{T})$$

then  $\Sigma$  is closed under the following rule

$$\text{if } \ulcorner \Box \varphi \urcorner \in \Sigma, \text{ then } \varphi \in \Sigma. \quad (\mathbf{RN}_*)$$

2. If  $\Sigma$  is closed under  $(\mathbf{RN}_*)$ , then  $\Sigma$  is closed under the following rule of detachment for ' $\prec$ ' (strict version of modus ponens)

$$\text{if } \ulcorner \varphi \prec \psi \urcorner \in \Sigma \text{ and } \varphi \in \Sigma, \text{ then } \psi \in \Sigma. \quad (\mathbf{SMP})$$

3. If  $E_{\mathbf{PL}} \subseteq \Sigma$  and  $\Sigma$  is closed under  $(\mathbf{SMP})$ , then  $\Sigma$  is closed under  $(\mathbf{RN}_*)$ .

PROOF: For 3. Let  $\ulcorner \Box \varphi \urcorner \in \Sigma$ . Since  $E_{\mathbf{PL}} \subseteq \Sigma$  and  $\ulcorner \varphi \equiv (\mathbf{T} \supset \varphi) \urcorner \in \mathbf{PL}$ , we have that  $\ulcorner \Box \varphi \equiv \Box(\mathbf{T} \supset \varphi) \urcorner \in \Sigma$ . Hence, by  $\mathbf{PL}$ ,  $\ulcorner \Box(\mathbf{T} \supset \varphi) \urcorner \in \Sigma$ . So  $\varphi \in \Sigma$ , by  $(\mathbf{SMP})$  and  $\mathbf{PL}$ .  $\dashv$

## 1.2. t-regular modal systems

In [6] a modal system is called *t-regular* iff it includes the set  $R_{\mathbf{PL}}$ . Thus, the set  $R_{\mathbf{PL}}$  replaces the rule  $(\mathbf{RR})$  in the formulation of regular systems.

By definition, any modal system which includes some t-regular system, is also t-regular. So, if  $\mathbf{A}$  is a t-regular logic, then  $\mathbf{A}[\Phi]$  is. Moreover, every regular system is t-regular.

FACT 1.13. *For any t-regular modal system  $\Sigma$  the following conditions are equivalent:*

- (a)  $\Diamond\top \in \Sigma$ ,
- (b)  $\Sigma$  contains all instances of the following formula

$$\Box p \supset \Diamond p \quad (\text{D})$$

FACT 1.14. *For any t-regular modal system  $\Sigma$ , if  $\Sigma$  contains one of the following formula, then  $\Sigma$  contains all the following formulae:<sup>1</sup>*

$$\begin{aligned} \Box p \supset (p \vee \Box q) \\ \Diamond q \supset (\Box p \supset p) \\ \Diamond(q \supset q) \supset (\Box p \supset p) \\ \neg\Box(q \wedge \neg q) \supset (\Box p \supset p) \end{aligned} \quad (\text{T}_q)$$

The logic  $\mathbf{C1}$  from [7] is the smallest t-regular system.  $\mathbf{C1}$  is a logic and  $\mathbf{C1} := \mathbf{PL}[\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{PL}}]$ . The logics  $\mathbf{D1}$  and  $\mathbf{E1}$  from [4] are respectively the smallest t-regular logics which contain (D) and (T), i.e.  $\mathbf{D1} := \mathbf{PL}[\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{PL}}, \text{D}] = \mathbf{C1}[\text{D}] = \mathbf{C1}[\Diamond\top]$  and  $\mathbf{E1} := \mathbf{PL}[\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{PL}}, \text{T}] = \mathbf{C1}[\text{T}]$ . We have that  $\mathbf{C1} \subsetneq \mathbf{D1} \subsetneq \mathbf{E1}$  and  $\mathbf{C1} \subsetneq \mathbf{C1}[\text{T}_q] \subsetneq \mathbf{E1}$  (see [6])

Notice that  $\mathbf{E1} = \mathbf{C1}[\text{D}, \text{T}_q]$ . Indeed, from  $\mathbf{C1}$  and (D) we obtain ' $\Diamond(q \supset q)$ ', and hence (T), by (T<sub>q</sub>) and (MP).

### 1.3. t-normal modal systems

In [6] a modal system is called *t-normal* iff it contains all instances of (K) and includes the set  $\Box\mathbf{PL}$ . Thus, the set  $\Box\mathbf{PL}$  replaces the rule (RN) in the formulation of normal systems. By definitions, any modal system which includes some t-normal system, is also t-normal. So, if  $\mathbf{A}$  is a t-normal logic, then  $\mathbf{A}[\Phi]$  is. Moreover, every normal system is t-normal.

<sup>1</sup>The name 'T<sub>q</sub>' is an abbreviation for 'quasi-T', because for normal logics with (T) (resp. (T<sub>q</sub>)) we use reflexive (resp. quasi-reflexive) standard Kripke models.

By lemmas 1.6–1.9 we obtain:

LEMMA 1.15. *For any system the following conditions are equivalent:*

- (a) *it is t-normal,*
- (b) *it is t-regular and contains  $\Box\top$ ,*
- (c) *it is t-regular and contains some formula of the form  $\lceil\Box\varphi\rceil$ .*

In [4] the logic **S0.5** is the smallest modal logic which includes  $\Box\text{Taut}$ , and contains (K) and (T). The logic **S0.5**<sup>°</sup> is associated with Lemmon's **S0.5**. It is the smallest logic which includes  $\Box\text{Taut}$  and contains (K). Of course, by uniform substitution, **S0.5** and **S0.5**<sup>°</sup> include the set  $\Box\text{PL}$ ; so **S0.5**<sup>°</sup> is the smallest t-normal system, and **S0.5** is the smallest t-normal system which includes  $\text{sub}(\text{T})$ . So we have that **S0.5**<sup>°</sup> := **PL**[ $\Box\text{Taut}$ , K] = **C1**[ $\Box\top$ ] and **S0.5** := **PL**[ $\Box\text{Taut}$ , K, T] = **S0.5**<sup>°</sup>[T] = **E1**[ $\Box\top$ ]. It is the case that **S0.5**<sup>°</sup>  $\subsetneq$  **S0.5**<sup>°</sup>[D]  $\subsetneq$  **S0.5**, because (D)  $\notin$  **S0.5**<sup>°</sup> and (T)  $\notin$  **S0.5**<sup>°</sup>[D]. Moreover, **S0.5**<sup>°</sup>  $\subsetneq$  **S0.5**<sup>°</sup>[T<sub>q</sub>]  $\subsetneq$  **S0.5**, since (T<sub>q</sub>)  $\notin$  **S0.5**<sup>°</sup> and (T)  $\notin$  **S0.5**<sup>°</sup>[T<sub>q</sub>] (see e.g. [6] and Corollary 3.5 in the second part). Notice that **S0.5** = **S0.5**<sup>°</sup>[D, T<sub>q</sub>].

By Lemma 1.12, the logic **S0.5** is closed under (RN<sub>\*</sub>) and (SMP). However for any  $\varphi \in \text{For}$ :  $\lceil\Box\varphi\rceil \in \text{S0.5}^\circ$  iff  $\varphi \in \text{PL}$  iff  $\lceil\Box\varphi\rceil \in \text{S0.5}$  (see Fact 3.8 in the second part). So **S0.5**<sup>°</sup>, **S0.5**<sup>°</sup>[D] and **S0.5**<sup>°</sup>[T<sub>q</sub>] are also closed under (RN<sub>\*</sub>) and (SMP).<sup>2</sup>

#### 1.4. Replacement for tautologous equivalents

We say that a modal system  $\Sigma$  is an *rte-system* iff  $\Sigma$  is closed under replacement for tautologous equivalents, i.e.:

$$\forall_{\varphi, \psi, \chi \in \text{For}}: \text{if } \lceil\varphi \equiv \psi\rceil \in \text{PL} \text{ and } \chi \in \Sigma, \text{ then } \chi[\varphi/\psi] \in \Sigma. \quad (\text{rte})$$

We consider the following sets of formulae:

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<sup>2</sup>Notice that the rules (RN<sub>\*</sub>) and (SMP) are not derivable in **S0.5**<sup>°</sup>, **S0.5**<sup>°</sup>[D] and **S0.5**<sup>°</sup>[T<sub>q</sub>] in the following sense. We can consider **S0.5**<sup>°</sup> (resp. **S0.5**<sup>°</sup>[D]; **S0.5**<sup>°</sup>[T<sub>q</sub>]; **S0.5**) as being axiomatized by axioms **PL**,  $\text{sub}(\text{K})$  (resp. plus  $\text{sub}(\text{D})$ ;  $\text{sub}(\text{T}_q)$ ;  $\text{sub}(\text{T})$ ) and the sole rule (MP). Of course, in such axiomatic system of **S0.5**<sup>°</sup> (resp. **S0.5**<sup>°</sup>[D]; **S0.5**<sup>°</sup>[T<sub>q</sub>]), if  $\varphi \notin \text{PL}$ , then from  $\lceil\Box\varphi\rceil$  we do not obtain  $\varphi$ , since **PL**,  $\text{sub}(\text{K})$ ,  $\text{sub}(\text{D})$ ,  $\text{sub}(\text{T}_q)$   $\not\vdash_{\text{PL}}$   $\Box\varphi \supset \varphi$ .



$$\begin{aligned} \text{REP}_{\mathbf{PL}} &:= \{ \ulcorner \chi \equiv \chi[\varphi/\psi] \urcorner : \chi \in \text{For} \ \& \ \ulcorner \varphi \equiv \psi \urcorner \in \mathbf{PL} \}, \\ \mathbf{PL}_{\text{rte}} &:= \{ \tau[\varphi^1/\psi_1, \dots, \varphi^k/\psi_k] \in \text{For} : \tau \in \mathbf{PL} \ \& \\ &\quad \ulcorner \varphi_1 \equiv \psi_1 \urcorner \in \mathbf{PL}, \dots, \ulcorner \varphi_k \equiv \psi_k \urcorner \in \mathbf{PL} \}, \end{aligned}$$

where  $\tau[\varphi^1/\psi_1, \dots, \varphi^k/\psi_k]$  is any formula that results from  $\tau$  by replacing zero, one or more occurrences of  $\varphi_i$ , in  $\tau$ , by  $\psi_i$ . Since  $\ulcorner \chi \equiv \chi \urcorner \in \mathbf{PL}$ , we have that:  $\text{REP}_{\mathbf{PL}} \subseteq \mathbf{PL}_{\text{rte}}$  and  $\Box \text{REP}_{\mathbf{PL}} \subseteq \Box \mathbf{PL}_{\text{rte}}$ .

We will now focus on general properties of rte-systems.

LEMMA 1.16. *For any system  $\Sigma$  the following conditions are equivalent:*

- (a)  $\Sigma$  is an rte-system,
  - (b)  $\mathbf{PL}_{\text{rte}} \subseteq \Sigma$ ,
  - (c)  $\text{REP}_{\mathbf{PL}} \subseteq \Sigma$ ,
1.  $\Sigma$  is closed under the following replacement

$$\forall \varphi, \psi, \chi \in \text{For} : \text{if } \ulcorner \varphi \equiv \psi \urcorner \in \mathbf{PL}, \text{ then } \ulcorner \Box \chi \equiv \Box \chi[\varphi/\psi] \urcorner \in \Sigma.$$

PROOF: “(a)  $\Rightarrow$  (b)” If  $\ulcorner \varphi_i \equiv \psi_i \urcorner \in \mathbf{PL}$ ,  $i = 1, \dots, k$ , and  $\tau \in \mathbf{PL} \subseteq \Sigma$  then  $\tau[\varphi^1/\psi_1] \in \Sigma, \dots, \tau[\varphi^1/\psi_1, \dots, \varphi^k/\psi_k] \in \Sigma$ , by (rte). Thus,  $\mathbf{PL}_{\text{rte}} \subseteq \Sigma$ .

“(b)  $\Rightarrow$  (c)” By the fact that  $\text{REP}_{\mathbf{PL}} \subseteq \mathbf{PL}_{\text{rte}}$ .

“(c)  $\Rightarrow$  (a)” If  $\ulcorner \varphi \equiv \psi \urcorner \in \mathbf{PL}$ , then  $\ulcorner \chi \equiv \chi[\varphi/\psi] \urcorner \in \text{REP}_{\mathbf{PL}} \subseteq \Sigma$ .

Moreover, if  $\chi \in \Sigma$ , then  $\chi[\varphi/\psi] \in \Sigma$ , by  $\mathbf{PL}$ .

“(c)  $\Rightarrow$  (d)” Obvious.

“(d)  $\Rightarrow$  (c)” Suppose that  $\ulcorner \varphi \equiv \psi \urcorner \in \mathbf{PL}$ . First we consider the possibility that  $\chi = \varphi$ . Then  $\chi[\varphi/\psi] = \varphi$  or  $\chi[\varphi/\psi] = \psi$ .

Thus we may assume henceforth that  $\chi \neq \varphi$ . The proof proceeds by induction on the complexity of  $\chi$ . We give it for the cases in which  $\chi$  is (\*) atomic; (\*\*)  $\ulcorner \neg \chi_1 \urcorner$  or  $\ulcorner \chi_1 \circ \chi_2 \urcorner$ , for  $\circ = \vee, \wedge, \supset, \equiv$ ; and (\*\*\*) a necessitation,  $\ulcorner \Box \chi_1 \urcorner$ .

For (\*): There is no replacement in this case. For (\*\*): by the assumption.

For the inductive case (\*\*) we assume, for induction, that the result holds for all sentences shorter than  $\chi$ . So  $\ulcorner \chi_1 \equiv \chi_1[\varphi/\psi] \urcorner \in \mathbf{A}$  and  $\ulcorner \chi_2 \equiv \chi_2[\varphi/\psi] \urcorner \in \mathbf{A}$ . It follows (by PL) that  $\ulcorner \neg \chi_1 \equiv \neg \chi_1[\varphi/\psi] \urcorner \in \mathbf{A}$  and  $\ulcorner (\chi_1 \circ \chi_2) \equiv (\chi_1 \circ \chi_2)[\varphi/\psi] \urcorner \in \mathbf{A}$ , for  $\circ = \vee, \wedge, \supset, \equiv$ .  $\dashv$

By lemmas 1.16, 1.6, 1.9 and 1.15 we obtain:

COROLLARY 1.17. *For any rte-system  $\Sigma$ :*

1.  $E_{\mathbf{PL}} \subseteq \Sigma$ .
2.  $\Box\top \in \Sigma$  iff  $\Box\mathbf{PL} \subseteq \Sigma$ .
3. If  $\Box\top \in \Sigma$  and  $\text{sub}(\mathbf{K}) \subseteq \Sigma$ , then  $\Sigma$  is *t-normal*; consequently  $R_{\mathbf{PL}} \subseteq \Sigma$ ,  $\text{sub}(\mathbf{X}) \subseteq \Sigma$  and  $\text{sub}(\mathbf{R}) \subseteq \Sigma$ .
4. If  $\text{sub}(\mathbf{X}) \subseteq \Sigma$ , then  $\text{sub}(\mathbf{K}) \subseteq \Sigma$ .

Of course, any modal system which includes some rte-system, is also an rte-system. So if  $\mathbf{A}$  is an rte-logic, then  $\mathbf{A}[\Phi]$  is.

FACT 1.18. *The set  $\mathbf{PL}_{\text{rte}}$  is the smallest rte-system and rte-logic.*

PROOF: Of course,  $\mathbf{PL} \subseteq \mathbf{PL}_{\text{rte}}$ . Let  $\ulcorner \chi_1 \supset \chi_2 \urcorner \in \mathbf{PL}_{\text{rte}}$  and  $\chi_1 \in \mathbf{PL}_{\text{rte}}$ , i.e., for some  $\tau_0 \in \mathbf{PL}$ ,  $\psi_0 \in \text{For}$  we have that:  $\chi_1 = \tau_0[\varphi^1/\psi_1, \dots, \varphi^k/\psi_k]$ ,  $\ulcorner \tau_0 \supset \psi_0 \urcorner \in \mathbf{PL}$ ,  $\chi_2 = \psi_0[\varphi^{k+1}/\psi_{k+1}, \dots, \varphi^{k+m}/\psi_{k+m}]$  and  $\ulcorner \varphi_1 \equiv \psi_1 \urcorner \in \mathbf{PL}$ ,  $\dots$ ,  $\ulcorner \varphi_{k+m} \equiv \psi_{k+m} \urcorner \in \mathbf{PL}$ . Hence  $\psi_0 \in \mathbf{PL}$ ; so  $\chi_2 \in \mathbf{PL}_{\text{rte}}$ . Thus,  $\mathbf{PL}_{\text{rte}}$  is a modal system. From Lemma 1.16,  $\mathbf{PL}_{\text{rte}}$  is the smallest rte-system.

For any uniform substitution  $s$  of formulae for propositional letters,  $s(\tau[\varphi^1/\psi_1, \dots, \varphi^k/\psi_k]) = s(\tau)[s(\varphi^1)/s(\psi_1), \dots, s(\varphi^k)/s(\psi_k)]$  and  $s(\tau) \in \mathbf{PL}$ .  $\dashv$

Notice that  $\mathbf{S0.5}^\circ$  (and so also  $\mathbf{S0.5}^\circ$ ,  $\mathbf{S0.5}^\circ[\mathbf{D}]$  and  $\mathbf{S0.5}^\circ[\mathbf{T}_q]$ ) is not closed under (rte). For example, the formulae:

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{a)} & \Box\Box p \supset \Box\Box \neg\neg p \\ \text{b)} & \Box\Box \neg\neg p \supset \Box\Box p \end{array} \quad (\dagger)$$

do not belong to these logics (see e.g. Fact 3.6 in the second part).

COROLLARY 1.19. *For any rte-system  $\Sigma$  which includes  $M_{\mathbf{PL}}$  and has some formula of the form  $\ulcorner \Box\varphi \urcorner$  (consequently,  $\Box\top \in \Sigma$ , by Lemma 1.8):*

1.  $\Box\text{REP}_{\mathbf{PL}} \subseteq \Box\mathbf{PL}_{\text{rte}} \subseteq \Sigma$ ,
2.  $\Sigma$  is closed under the following replacement

$$\forall_{\varphi, \psi, \chi \in \text{For}}: \text{ if } \ulcorner \varphi \equiv \psi \urcorner \in \mathbf{PL}, \text{ then } \ulcorner \chi \succ \chi[\varphi/\psi] \urcorner \in \Sigma. \quad (\text{srte})$$

PROOF: 1. Let  $\tau \in \mathbf{PL}$ . By Corollary 1.17,  $\Box\tau \in \Sigma$ . So if  $\ulcorner \varphi \equiv \psi \urcorner \in \mathbf{PL}$ , then  $\Box\tau[\varphi/\psi] \in \Sigma$ , by (rte).

2. By 1,  $\ulcorner \Box(\chi \supset \chi[\varphi/\psi]) \urcorner$  and  $\ulcorner \Box(\chi[\varphi/\psi] \supset \chi) \urcorner$  belong to  $\Sigma$ .  $\dashv$

Moreover, we obtain:

LEMMA 1.20. *For any rte-system  $\Sigma$ :*

$$\text{if } \text{sub}(\Box(X)) \subseteq \Sigma, \text{ then } \text{sub}(\Box(K)) \subseteq \Sigma.$$

PROOF: If  $\ulcorner \Box((\Box(T \supset \varphi) \wedge \Box(\varphi \supset \psi)) \supset \Box(T \supset \psi)) \urcorner \in \Sigma$ , then  $\ulcorner \Box(\Box(\varphi \supset \psi) \supset (\Box\varphi \supset \Box\psi)) \urcorner \in \Sigma$ , by **PL** and two applications of (rte), since  $\ulcorner \varphi \equiv (T \supset \varphi) \urcorner \in \mathbf{PL}$  and  $\ulcorner \psi \equiv (T \supset \psi) \urcorner \in \mathbf{PL}$ .  $\dashv$

Let  $\mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}^\circ$ ,  $\mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}^\circ[\mathbf{D}]$ ,  $\mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}^\circ[\mathbf{T}_q]$  and  $\mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}$  be, respectively, such versions of the logics  $\mathbf{S0.5}^\circ$ ,  $\mathbf{S0.5}^\circ[\mathbf{D}]$ ,  $\mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}^\circ[\mathbf{T}_q]$  and  $\mathbf{S0.5}$  that are closed under (rte). Thus,  $\mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}^\circ$  is the smallest t-normal rte-system; so  $\mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}^\circ = \mathbf{PL}[\text{REP}_{\mathbf{PL}}, \mathbf{K}, \Box\top]$ . The logics  $\mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}^\circ[\mathbf{D}]$ ,  $\mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}^\circ[\mathbf{T}_q]$  and  $\mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}$  are the smallest t-normal rte-logics which contain (D), ( $\mathbf{T}_q$ ) and (T), respectively. Thus,  $\mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}} = \mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}^\circ[\mathbf{T}] = \mathbf{PL}[\text{REP}_{\mathbf{PL}}, \mathbf{K}, \mathbf{T}, \Box\top]$  and  $\mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}^\circ[\mathbf{D}] = \mathbf{PL}[\text{REP}_{\mathbf{PL}}, \mathbf{K}, \mathbf{D}, \Box\top]$ . We have that  $\mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}^\circ \subsetneq \mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}^\circ[\mathbf{D}] \subsetneq \mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}$ , because (D)  $\notin \mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}^\circ$  and (T)  $\notin \mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}^\circ[\mathbf{D}]$ . Moreover, we have that  $\mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}^\circ \subsetneq \mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}^\circ[\mathbf{T}_q] \subsetneq \mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}$ , because ( $\mathbf{T}_q$ )  $\notin \mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}^\circ$  and (T)  $\notin \mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}^\circ[\mathbf{T}_q]$  (see [6]).

By Lemma 1.12, the logic  $\mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}$  is closed under (RN<sub>\*</sub>) and (SMP). However for any  $\varphi \in \text{For}$ :  $\ulcorner \Box\varphi \urcorner \in \mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}^\circ$  iff  $\varphi \in \mathbf{PL}_{\text{rte}}$  iff  $\ulcorner \Box\varphi \urcorner \in \mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}$  (see Fact 4.5 in the second part). So, by Lemma 1.16,  $\mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}^\circ$  is also closed under (RN<sub>\*</sub>) and (SMP).

Let  $\mathbf{C1}_{\text{rte}}$ ,  $\mathbf{D1}_{\text{rte}}$ ,  $\mathbf{C1}_{\text{rte}}[\mathbf{T}_q]$  and  $\mathbf{E1}_{\text{rte}}$  be, respectively, such versions of the logics **C1**, **D1**, **C1**[ $\mathbf{T}_q$ ] and **E1** that are closed under (rte). The logic  $\mathbf{C1}_{\text{rte}}$  is the smallest t-regular rte-system; so  $\mathbf{C1}_{\text{rte}} = \mathbf{PL}[\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{PL}}, \text{REP}_{\mathbf{PL}}]$ .  $\mathbf{D1}_{\text{rte}}$ ,  $\mathbf{C1}_{\text{rte}}[\mathbf{T}_q]$  and  $\mathbf{E1}_{\text{rte}}$  are smallest t-regular rte-logics which contain (D), ( $\mathbf{T}_q$ ) and (T), respectively. We have that  $\mathbf{C1}_{\text{rte}} \subsetneq \mathbf{D1}_{\text{rte}} \subsetneq \mathbf{E1}_{\text{rte}}$  and  $\mathbf{C1}_{\text{rte}} \subsetneq \mathbf{C1}_{\text{rte}}[\mathbf{T}_q] \subsetneq \mathbf{E1}_{\text{rte}}$  (see [6]).

Finally notice that for the smallest rte-logic  $\mathbf{PL}_{\text{rte}}$  we have “valuation semantics”. Let  $\text{Val}_{\text{rte}}^{\text{cl}}$  be the set of all valuations  $V: \text{For} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  from  $\text{Val}^{\text{cl}}$  satisfying the following condition:

$$\forall \varphi, \psi, \chi \in \text{For}: \text{if } \ulcorner \varphi \equiv \psi \urcorner \in \mathbf{PL}, \text{ then } V(\chi) = V(\chi[\varphi/\psi]). \quad (\star)$$

For the set  $\text{Val}_{\text{rte}}^{\text{cl}}$  we have a fact analogous to Lemma 1.1 for  $\text{Val}^{\text{cl}}$ .

LEMMA 1.21. 1.  $V \in \mathbf{Val}_{\text{rte}}^{\text{cl}}$  iff for some  $v: \text{PA}t \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  such that

$$\forall_{\varphi, \psi, \chi \in \text{For}}: \text{if } \ulcorner \varphi \equiv \psi \urcorner \in \mathbf{PL}, \text{ then } v(\Box\chi) = v(\Box\chi[\varphi/\psi]), \quad (\star_{\text{PA}t})$$

$V$  is the unique extension of  $v$  by classical truth conditions for truth-value operators.

2. For any  $\varphi \in \text{For}$ :  $\varphi \in \mathbf{PL}_{\text{rte}}$  iff for any  $v: \text{PA}t \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  satisfying  $(\star_{\text{PA}t})$  we have that  $V(\varphi) = 1$ , where  $V$  is the unique extension of  $v$  by classical truth conditions for truth-value operators.

3. For any  $\varphi \in \text{For}$ :  $\varphi \in \mathbf{PL}_{\text{rte}}$  iff for any  $V \in \mathbf{Val}_{\text{rte}}^{\text{cl}}$ ,  $V(\varphi) = 1$ .

PROOF: 1. “ $\Leftarrow$ ” Let  $\chi, \varphi, \psi \in \text{For}$  such such  $\ulcorner \varphi \equiv \psi \urcorner \in \mathbf{PL}$ . By Lemma 1.1,  $V \in \mathbf{Val}^{\text{cl}}$  and  $V(\varphi) = V(\psi)$ .

First we consider the possibility that  $\chi = \varphi$ . Then  $\chi[\varphi/\psi] = \psi$  (when there is no replacement) or  $\chi[\varphi/\psi] = \varphi$  (when  $\varphi$  is replaced by  $\psi$ ). So  $V(\chi) = V(\chi[\varphi/\psi])$ , by the assumption.

Thus we may assume henceforth that  $\chi \neq \varphi$ . The proof proceeds by induction on the complexity of  $\chi$ . We give it for the cases in which  $\chi$  is (\*) atomic; (\*\*)  $\ulcorner \neg\chi_1 \urcorner$  or  $\ulcorner \chi_1 \circ \chi_2 \urcorner$ , for  $\circ = \vee, \wedge, \supset, \equiv$ ; and (\*\*\*) a necessitation,  $\ulcorner \Box\chi_1 \urcorner$ .

For (\*): There is no replacement. For (\*\*): For any  $\chi_1 \in \text{For}$  we have that  $V(\Box\chi_1) = v(\Box\chi_1)$ . So we use the assumption  $(\star_{\text{PA}t})$ .

For the inductive case (\*\*) we assume that the result holds for all sentences shorter than  $\chi$ . So  $V(\chi_1) = V(\chi_1[\varphi/\psi])$  and  $V(\chi_2) = V(\chi_2[\varphi/\psi])$ . We have:  $V(\neg\chi_1) = V(\neg\chi_1[\varphi/\psi])$  and  $V(\chi_1 \circ \chi_2) = V((\chi_1 \circ \chi_2)[\varphi/\psi])$ , since  $V \in \mathbf{Val}^{\text{cl}}$ .

“ $\Rightarrow$ ” We put  $v := V|_{\text{PA}t}$ . By the part “ $\Leftarrow$ ”, the unique extension of  $v$  by classical truth conditions for truth-value operators belongs to  $\mathbf{Val}_{\text{rte}}^{\text{cl}}$  and it is equal to  $V$ .

2. “ $\Leftarrow$ ” Suppose that  $\varphi$  is built by means of truth-value operators, different propositional letters  $\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_n$  and different necessitations  $\ulcorner \Box\chi_1 \urcorner, \dots, \ulcorner \Box\chi_m \urcorner$  ( $n + m \geq 0$ ).

If  $m = 0$ , i.e.  $\varphi$  is a classical formula, then  $\varphi \in \text{Taut}$ . Moreover,  $\varphi \in \mathbf{PL}$ , if  $m > 0$  but there is no  $i, j = 1, \dots, m$  such that  $\chi_i = \chi_j[\psi/\psi']$ , for some  $\psi, \psi' \in \text{For}$  such that  $\ulcorner \psi \equiv \psi' \urcorner \in \mathbf{PL}$ . Indeed, in none of both cases condition  $(\star_{\text{PA}t})$  is connected with  $\varphi$ , so this formula is true for an arbitrary valuation  $v: \text{PA}t \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ .

Let us assume that  $m > 0$ . We define the following equivalence relation in  $\{\Box\chi_1, \dots, \Box\chi_m\}$ :

$$\Box\chi_i R \Box\chi_j \stackrel{\text{def}}{\iff} \chi_i = \chi_j[\psi/\psi'],$$

for some  $\psi, \psi' \in \text{For}$  such that  $\ulcorner\psi \equiv \psi'\urcorner \in \mathbf{PL}$ .

If it is the identity relation in  $\{\Box\chi_1, \dots, \Box\chi_m\}$ , then the second considered case holds.

Let  $\|\varrho_1\|_R, \dots, \|\varrho_k\|_R$  be different equivalence classes from  $\{\Box\chi_1, \dots, \Box\chi_m\}/R$ . For different formulae  $\varrho_1, \dots, \varrho_k$  we assign different propositional letters  $\beta_1, \dots, \beta_k$  (these letters are to be different as well from  $\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_n$ ). All formulae from  $\|\varrho_i\|_R$  are replaced by  $\varrho_i$ . We obtain the formula  $\varphi^*$ . Now, every  $\varrho_i$  is being replaced by  $\beta_i$ . In this way we obtain the classical formula  $\varphi_{\text{cl}}^*$ . By the assumption we have that  $\varphi_{\text{cl}}^* \in \text{Taut}$ . Replacing  $\varrho_i$  for  $\beta_i$  in  $\varphi_{\text{cl}}^*$  we obtain  $\varphi^*$ . Therefore  $\varphi^* \in \mathbf{PL}$ . The latest formula can be transformed into  $\varphi$  by suitable replacements (reverting to the initial ones) of formula  $\varrho_i$ . Thus  $\varphi \in \mathbf{PL}_{\text{rte}}$ .

3. “ $\Rightarrow$ ” Let  $\varphi \in \mathbf{PL}_{\text{rte}}$ , i.e., there are  $\tau \in \mathbf{PL}$  and  $\psi_1, \dots, \psi_k, \psi'_1, \dots, \psi'_k \in \text{For}$  such that  $\ulcorner\psi_1 \equiv \psi'_1\urcorner \in \mathbf{PL}, \dots, \ulcorner\psi_k \equiv \psi'_k\urcorner \in \mathbf{PL}$  and  $\varphi = \tau[\psi/\psi'_1, \dots, \psi_k/\psi'_k]$ . For any  $V \in \text{Val}_{\text{rte}}^{\text{cl}}$  we have that  $V(\tau) = 1$ , because  $\text{Val}_{\text{rte}}^{\text{cl}} \subseteq \text{Val}^{\text{cl}}$ . Thus, by  $(\star)$ ,  $V(\varphi) = V(\tau) = 1$ .

“ $\Leftarrow$ ” Let  $\varphi \notin \mathbf{PL}_{\text{rte}}$ . Then, by the part “ $\Leftarrow$ ” of 2, for some  $v: \text{PA}_t \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  which satisfies the condition  $(\star_{\text{PA}_t})$  we have that  $V(\varphi) = 0$ , where  $V$  is the unique extension of  $v$  by classical truth conditions for truth-value operators. Moreover, by 1,  $V \in \text{Val}_{\text{rte}}^{\text{cl}}$ .

2. “ $\Rightarrow$ ” By the part “ $\Rightarrow$ ” of 1 and the part “ $\Rightarrow$ ” of 3. ⊢

### 1.5. Strict classical logics. The logics $\mathbf{S1}$ , $\mathbf{S0.9}$ , $\mathbf{S1}^\circ$ and $\mathbf{S0.9}^\circ$

After [1], we say that a logic  $\mathbf{A}$  is *strict<sub>T</sub> classical* (“*traditionally strict classical*”) iff  $\Box\mathbf{PL} \subseteq \mathbf{A}$  and  $\mathbf{A}$  is closed under “traditional replacement rule for strict equivalents”:

$$\text{if } \ulcorner\varphi \succ \psi\urcorner \in \mathbf{A} \text{ and } \chi \in \mathbf{A}, \text{ then } \chi[\varphi/\psi] \in \mathbf{A}. \quad (\text{RRSE}_T)$$

Moreover, a logic  $\mathbf{A}$  is called *strict classical* iff  $\Box\mathbf{PL} \subseteq \mathbf{A}$  and  $\mathbf{A}$  is closed under the following replacement rule:

$$\text{if } \ulcorner\Box(\varphi \equiv \psi)\urcorner \in \mathbf{A} \text{ and } \chi \in \mathbf{A}, \text{ then } \chi[\varphi/\psi] \in \mathbf{A}. \quad (\text{RRSE})$$

We obtain that for modal logics which contain (K) and/or (X), the above notions are equivalent. Firstly we notice that:

LEMMA 1.22 ([1]). *Every strict<sub>T</sub> or strict classical logic is an rte-system.*

Secondly, by lemmas 1.11 and 1.22, and Corollary 1.17 we have that:

LEMMA 1.23 ([1]). *For every logic  $\mathbf{A}$  which contains  $(\mathbf{K})$  or  $(\mathbf{X})$ :  $\mathbf{A}$  is strict<sub>T</sub> classical iff  $\mathbf{A}$  is strict classical.*

The logic **S0.9** (resp. **S1**) is the smallest strict classical logic which contains the formulae  $(\mathbf{T})$ ,  $\Box(\mathbf{T})$  and  $\Box(\mathbf{K})$  (resp.  $\Box(\mathbf{X})$ ). For these logics see e.g. [1, 4, 6]. By lemmas 1.20 and 1.22, **S0.9**  $\subseteq$  **S1**. In [3] it was proved that **S0.9**  $\neq$  **S1**, since  $\Box(\mathbf{X}) \notin \mathbf{S0.9}$  (see also e.g. [1, pp. 15–16]).

In [1] the Feys' logic **S1**<sup>o</sup> from [2] is described as the smallest strict<sub>T</sub> classical logic which contains the formulae  $(\mathbf{X})$  and  $\Box(\mathbf{X})$ , and is closed under (SMP). In [8] the logic **S1**<sup>o</sup> is described as the smallest strict<sub>T</sub> classical logic which contains the formulae  $(\mathbf{X})$  and  $\Box(\mathbf{X})$ , and is closed under (RN<sub>\*</sub>). By lemmas 1.12 and 1.22 both characterizations are equivalent.

Again by lemmas 1.20 and 1.22, and Corollary 1.17,  $(\mathbf{K}), \Box(\mathbf{K}) \in \mathbf{S1}^o$ . Since  $(\mathbf{X}) \in \mathbf{S1}$  and **S1** is closed under (SMP), so **S1**<sup>o</sup>  $\subseteq$  **S1**. Because  $(\mathbf{T}), \Box(\mathbf{T}) \notin \mathbf{S1}^o$ , so **S1**<sup>o</sup>  $\neq$  **S1** (see e.g. [1]).

Moreover, in [1] the logic **S0.9**<sup>o</sup> is described as the smallest strict<sub>T</sub> classical logic which contains the formulae  $(\mathbf{K})$  and  $\Box(\mathbf{K})$ , and is closed under (SMP). We have **S0.9**<sup>o</sup>  $\subseteq$  **S1**<sup>o</sup>, because  $(\mathbf{K}), \Box(\mathbf{K}) \in \mathbf{S1}^o$ .

Since  $(\mathbf{T}) \notin \mathbf{S0.9}^o$ ,  $\Box(\mathbf{X}) \notin \mathbf{S0.9}$ ,  $(\mathbf{K}) \in \mathbf{S0.9}$  and **S0.9** is closed under (SMP), so **S0.9**<sup>o</sup>  $\subsetneq$  **S0.9** and **S0.9**<sup>o</sup>  $\subsetneq$  **S1**<sup>o</sup>.

Notice that, by lemmas 1.12 and 1.22, the logics **S0.9**<sup>o</sup>, **S0.9**, **S1**<sup>o</sup> and **S1** are also closed under (RN<sub>\*</sub>). We can describe the logic **S0.9**<sup>o</sup> (resp. **S0.9**; **S1**<sup>o</sup>; **S1**) as the smallest logic which includes  $\Box\mathbf{Taut}$ , is closed under (RN<sub>\*</sub>) and (RRSE<sub>T</sub>), and contains  $\Box(\mathbf{K})$  (resp.  $\Box(\mathbf{K})$  and  $\Box(\mathbf{T})$ ;  $\Box(\mathbf{X})$ ;  $\Box(\mathbf{X})$  and  $\Box(\mathbf{T})$ ).

In the second part of this paper we shall prove that  $\Box(\mathbf{K}), \Box(\mathbf{T}) \notin \mathbf{S0.5}_{rte}$ , so **S0.5**<sup>o</sup><sub>rte</sub>  $\subsetneq$  **S0.9**<sup>o</sup> and **S0.5**<sub>rte</sub>  $\subsetneq$  **S0.9**.

In [1] the *Lewis version* **Lew**(**A**) of a logic **A** is understood as the smallest logic which includes **A** and contains the formula  $\Box\mathbf{T}$ , i.e. **Lew**(**A**) := **A**[ $\Box\mathbf{T}$ ] = **PL**[**A**,  $\Box\mathbf{T}$ ].

In [1] a logic is called *prenormal* iff it is congruential and contains the formula  $\lceil \Box\mathbf{T} \supset (\mathbf{K}) \rceil$ . Of course, every prenormal logic which contains  $\Box\mathbf{T}$  is normal. In [1] were considered the logics **PK**, **PX**, **PKT** and **PXT** which are the smallest congruential logics respectively containing:

(K); (K) and (T); (X); (X) and (T). By Lemma 1.6, these logics contain (K), so also  $\lceil \Box \top \supset (K) \rceil$ . Hence they are prenormal and we have that  $\mathbf{PK} \subseteq \mathbf{PX} \subseteq \mathbf{PXT}$  and  $\mathbf{PK} \subseteq \mathbf{PKT} \subseteq \mathbf{PXT}$ . In [1] it was proved that  $\mathbf{S0.9}^\circ = \mathbf{Lew}(\mathbf{PK}) := \mathbf{PK}[\Box \top]$ ,  $\mathbf{S0.9} = \mathbf{Lew}(\mathbf{PKT}) := \mathbf{PKT}[\Box \top]$ ,  $\mathbf{S1}^\circ = \mathbf{Lew}(\mathbf{PX}) := \mathbf{PX}[\Box \top]$  and  $\mathbf{S1} = \mathbf{Lew}(\mathbf{PXT}) := \mathbf{PXT}[\Box \top]$ .

Finally, notice that the logics  $\mathbf{S1}$ ,  $\mathbf{S0.9}$ ,  $\mathbf{S1}^\circ$  and  $\mathbf{S0.9}^\circ$  are not congruential and that the formulae  $\Box(\mathbf{M})$ ,  $\Box(\mathbf{C})$  and

$$\Box p \prec \Box(p \vee q) \quad (1.1)$$

$$\Diamond(p \wedge q) \prec \Diamond p \quad (1.2)$$

are not members of  $\mathbf{S1}$ , while the formulae  $(\mathbf{M})$ ,  $(\mathbf{C})$ ,  $\lceil \Box p \supset \Box(p \vee q) \rceil$  and  $\lceil \Diamond(p \wedge q) \supset \Diamond p \rceil$  belong to  $\mathbf{C1}$ .

### 1.6. The logics $\mathbf{S2}^\circ$ and $\mathbf{S2}$

We say the a logic  $\mathbf{A}$  is closed under *Becker's rule* iff for any  $\varphi, \psi \in \text{For}$ :

$$\text{if } \lceil \varphi \prec \psi \rceil \in \mathbf{A}, \text{ then } \lceil \Box \varphi \prec \Box \psi \rceil \in \mathbf{A}. \quad (\text{RB})$$

In [4] the logic  $\mathbf{S2}$  is described as the smallest modal logic which includes  $\Box \text{Taut}$ , contains the formulae (T),  $\Box(\mathbf{T})$ , and  $\Box(\mathbf{K})$ , and is closed under (RB). Of course,  $\mathbf{S2}$  includes  $\Box \mathbf{PL}$ , contains (K) and, by Lemma 1.12, it is closed under  $(\text{RN}_*)$  and (SMP).

Moreover, the logic  $\mathbf{S2}^\circ$  is described in [8] as the smallest logic which includes  $\Box \text{Taut}$ , contains  $\Box(\mathbf{K})$ , and is closed under (RB) and  $(\text{RN}_*)$ . Of course,  $\mathbf{S2}^\circ$  includes  $\Box \mathbf{PL}$ , contains (K) and, by Lemma 1.12, it is closed under (SMP). So  $\mathbf{S2}^\circ \subsetneq \mathbf{S2}$ . For example (T),  $\Box(\mathbf{T}) \notin \mathbf{S2}^\circ$ .

In [4] Lemmon proved that  $\Box(\mathbf{X}) \in \mathbf{S2}$  and  $\mathbf{S2}$  is closed under  $(\text{RRSE}_T)$ . His proof shows that also  $\Box(\mathbf{X}) \in \mathbf{S2}^\circ$  and  $\mathbf{S2}^\circ$  is closed under  $(\text{RRSE}_T)$ . So we have that  $\mathbf{S1}^\circ \subsetneq \mathbf{S2}^\circ$  and  $\mathbf{S1} \subsetneq \mathbf{S2}$ . Thus,  $\mathbf{S2}$  and  $\mathbf{S2}^\circ$  are strict<sub>T</sub> and strict classical, but they are not congruential.

In [1] it was proved that  $\mathbf{S2}^\circ = \mathbf{Lew}(\mathbf{C2}) := \mathbf{C2}[\Box \top]$  and  $\mathbf{S2} = \mathbf{Lew}(\mathbf{E2}) := \mathbf{E2}[\Box \top]$ . Moreover, for every  $\varphi \in \text{For}$ :

$$\lceil \Box \varphi \rceil \in \mathbf{S2}^\circ \quad \text{iff } \varphi \in \mathbf{C2}, \quad (1.3)$$

$$\lceil \Box \varphi \rceil \in \mathbf{S2} \quad \text{iff } \varphi \in \mathbf{E2}. \quad (1.4)$$

Hence, the formulae  $\Box(\mathbf{M})$ ,  $\Box(\mathbf{C})$ , (1.1) and (1.2) belong to  $\mathbf{S2}^\circ$ , because  $(\mathbf{M})$ ,  $(\mathbf{C})$ ,  $\lceil \Box p \supset \Box(p \vee q) \rceil$  and  $\lceil \Diamond(p \wedge q) \supset \Diamond p \rceil$  belong to  $\mathbf{C1}$ .

## 2. Some new weak t-normal logics and t-normal rte-logics

In the present paper we examine some logics which are not strict classical, but these logics have the form  $\mathbf{A}[\Box\Phi]$ , where  $\Phi \subseteq \mathbf{S0.5}$  and  $\mathbf{A} = \mathbf{S0.5}^\circ$ ,  $\mathbf{S0.5}^\circ[\mathcal{D}]$ ,  $\mathbf{S0.5}^\circ[\mathcal{T}_q]$ ,  $\mathbf{S0.5}$ ,  $\mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}^\circ$ ,  $\mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}^\circ[\mathcal{D}]$ ,  $\mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}^\circ[\mathcal{T}_q]$ ,  $\mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}$ .

*Remark 2.1.* By Lemma 1.15, if a logic  $\mathbf{A}$  is t-regular (resp. a t-regular rte-system) and  $\Phi \neq \emptyset$ , then  $\mathbf{A}[\Box\Phi]$  is t-normal (resp. a t-normal rte-system).

For example,  $\mathbf{C1}[\Box\Phi] = \mathbf{S0.5}^\circ[\Box\Phi]$ , where  $\Phi \neq \emptyset$ . Similarly for t-regular logics  $\mathbf{D1}$ ,  $\mathbf{C1}[\mathcal{T}_q]$ ,  $\mathbf{E1}$ ,  $\mathbf{C1}_{\text{rte}}$ ,  $\mathbf{D1}_{\text{rte}}$ ,  $\mathbf{C1}_{\text{rte}}[\mathcal{T}_q]$ ,  $\mathbf{E1}_{\text{rte}}$  and suitable t-normal logics  $\mathbf{S0.5}^\circ[\mathcal{D}]$ ,  $\mathbf{S0.5}^\circ[\mathcal{T}_q]$ ,  $\mathbf{S0.5}$ ,  $\mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}^\circ$ ,  $\mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}^\circ[\mathcal{D}]$ ,  $\mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}^\circ[\mathcal{T}_q]$ ,  $\mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}$ .  $\dashv$

*Remark 2.2.* As we remember (see p. 42) the formulae  $(\dagger)$  do not belong to  $\mathbf{S0.5}$ . The formula  $(\dagger_a)$  belongs to  $\mathbf{S0.5}[\Box\mathbf{K}, \Box(\Box p \supset \Box \neg p)]$ , where  $\Box p \supset \Box \neg p \in \mathbf{C1}$ . But  $\Box(\dagger)$  and

$$\begin{aligned} \text{a)} \quad & \Box\Box\Box p \supset \Box\Box\Box \neg p \\ \text{b)} \quad & \Box\Box\Box \neg p \supset \Box\Box\Box p \end{aligned} \quad (\ddagger)$$

do not belong to  $\mathbf{S0.5}[\Box\mathbf{S0.5}]$ ; so this logic is not an rte-system (see the second part).  $\dashv$

In Section 3 for logics  $\mathbf{A}[\Box\Phi]$ , where  $\mathbf{A} = \mathbf{S0.5}^\circ$ ,  $\mathbf{S0.5}^\circ[\mathcal{D}]$ ,  $\mathbf{S0.5}^\circ[\mathcal{T}_q]$ ,  $\mathbf{S0.5}$ , we give simplified semantics formulated by means of some Kripke-style models. In Section 4 we give similar semantics for logics  $\mathbf{A}[\Box\Phi]$ , where  $\mathbf{A} = \mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}^\circ$ ,  $\mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}^\circ[\mathcal{D}]$ ,  $\mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}^\circ[\mathcal{T}_q]$ ,  $\mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}$ . In Section 5 we prove that considered logics are determined by some classes of these models.

Firstly notice that by Lemma 1.20 we obtain:

**COROLLARY 2.1.** *For any rte-logic  $\mathbf{A}$ :  $\mathbf{A}[\Box\Phi, \Box\mathbf{X}] = \mathbf{A}[\Box\Phi, \Box\mathbf{K}, \Box\mathbf{X}]$ .*

By facts from Section 1 and Corollary 2.1 we obtain:

**FACT 2.2.** 1.  $\mathbf{S0.5}^\circ[\Box\mathbf{K}] \subseteq \mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}^\circ[\Box\mathbf{K}] \subseteq \mathbf{S0.9}^\circ$ .  
 2.  $\mathbf{S0.5}[\Box\mathbf{K}, \Box\mathbf{T}] \subseteq \mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}[\Box\mathbf{K}, \Box\mathbf{T}] \subseteq \mathbf{S0.9}$ .  
 3.  $\mathbf{S0.5}^\circ[\Box\mathbf{K}, \Box\mathbf{X}] \subseteq \mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}^\circ[\Box\mathbf{X}] \subseteq \mathbf{S1}^\circ$ .  
 4.  $\mathbf{S0.5}[\Box\mathbf{T}, \Box\mathbf{K}, \Box\mathbf{X}] \subseteq \mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}[\Box\mathbf{X}, \Box\mathbf{T}] \subseteq \mathbf{S1}$ .



Moreover, we have:

LEMMA 2.3. *For any t-regular logic  $\mathbf{A}$  and  $\Phi, \Psi \subseteq \text{For}$ , if  $\Psi \models_{\mathbf{PL}} \Phi$ , then  $\mathbf{A}[\Box\Phi] \subseteq \mathbf{A}[\Box\Psi]$ .*

PROOF: Suppose that  $\Psi \models_{\mathbf{PL}} \Phi$ , i.e., for every  $\varphi \in \Phi$  there is a subset  $\{\psi_1, \dots, \psi_n\}$  of  $\Psi$ ,  $n \geq 0$ , such that  $\ulcorner (\psi_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \psi_n) \supset \varphi \urcorner \in \mathbf{PL}$ . Since  $\mathbf{A}$  is t-regular,  $\ulcorner (\Box\psi_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \Box\psi_n) \supset \Box\varphi \urcorner \in \mathbf{A}$ . Hence,  $\Box\varphi \in \mathbf{A}[\Box\Psi]$ , since  $\Box\psi_1, \dots, \Box\psi_n \in \mathbf{A}[\Box\Psi]$ .  $\dashv$

By the above lemma we obtain:

COROLLARY 2.4. *For any r-regular logic  $\mathbf{A}$ :  $\mathbf{A}[\Box\Phi, \Box\mathbf{C}] \subseteq \mathbf{A}[\Box\Phi, \Box\mathbf{R}]$ ,  $\mathbf{A}[\Box\Phi, \Box\mathbf{N}] \subseteq \mathbf{A}[\Box\Phi, \Box\mathbf{R}]$  and  $\mathbf{A}[\Box\Phi, \Box\mathbf{C}, \Box\mathbf{N}] = \mathbf{A}[\Box\Phi, \Box\mathbf{R}]$ .*

From the facts (1.3) and (1.4) we have:

FACT 2.5. 1. *If  $\Phi \subseteq \mathbf{C2}$ , then  $\mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}^\circ[\Box\Phi] \subseteq \mathbf{S2}^\circ$ .*  
 2. *If  $\Phi \subseteq \mathbf{E2}$ , then  $\mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}[\Box\Phi] \subseteq \mathbf{S2}$ .*

However in the present paper we are only interested in such a set  $\Box\Phi$ , as a set of new axioms, which satisfies condition  $\Phi \subseteq \mathbf{S0.5}$ . Notice that we have the following facts:

$$\mathbf{C1} = \mathbf{C2} \cap \mathbf{S0.5}^\circ, \quad (2.1)$$

$$\mathbf{C1} \subsetneq \mathbf{C2} \cap \mathbf{S0.5} \not\subseteq \mathbf{S0.5}^\circ, \quad (2.2)$$

$$\mathbf{E1} = \mathbf{E2} \cap \mathbf{S0.5}. \quad (2.3)$$

We have:  $\mathbf{C1} \subsetneq \mathbf{C2}$ ,  $\mathbf{C1} \subsetneq \mathbf{S0.5}^\circ \subsetneq \mathbf{S0.5}$ ,  $\mathbf{E1} \subsetneq \mathbf{E2}$  and  $\mathbf{E1} \subsetneq \mathbf{S0.5}$ . The remaining facts we will obtain from the semantics presented in [6] (see Fact 3.12 in the second part of this paper).

Therefore the following corollary will be of crucial importance:

COROLLARY 2.6. 1. *If  $\Phi \subseteq \mathbf{C2} \cap \mathbf{S0.5}$ , then  $\mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}^\circ[\Box\Phi] \subseteq \mathbf{S2}^\circ$ .*  
 2. *If  $\Phi \subseteq \mathbf{E1}$ , then  $\mathbf{S0.5}_{\text{rte}}[\Box\Phi] \subseteq \mathbf{S2}$ .*

In Section 6 (see Corollary 6.3 in the second part) we prove that in the subsequents in the above corollary the symbol ' $\subseteq$ ' can be replaced by ' $\subsetneq$ '.

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